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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2007 marked a high point in the international law arena: on
February 26, 2007, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a decision
regarding charges of genocide in Bosnia during the early 1990s.' In the 171-
page Bosnian Genocide decision, the ICJ applied the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) 2
for the first time in the history of international law.' Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Bosnia) brought the case sixteen years ago against Serbia and Montenegro
(Serbia).4 Bosnia claimed that Serbia was accountable for the genocide
committed in Bosnia after the demise of the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.5 In its final judgment, the ICJ held that Serbia violated its
obligations under the Genocide Convention by failing to act to prevent
genocide in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica6 in July 1995; however, since the
court found no specific intent, the ICJ held that Serbia itself did not commit,
conspire to commit, or incite the commission of the crime of genocide.7
Furthermore, the ICJ found that Serbia had violated its obligations under the
Genocide Convention by failing to cooperate with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);8 Serbia refused to extradite war
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 4 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosnian
Genocide].
2 Id. paras. 439-42; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, approved for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter
Genocide Convention].
I Bruce Zagaris, ICJIssues Mixed Verdict in Bosnia Herzegovina/Serbia Genocide Case, 23
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 202 (2007).
' Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, para. 3. On February 4, 2003, the name of the
respondent evolved from "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" to "Serbia and Montenegro." Id.
para. 32. "The title of the case was duly changed and the name 'Serbia and Montenegro' was
used thereafter for all official purposes of the Court." Id. The respondent's name changed to
"the Republic of Serbia" after Montenegro declared independence on May 21, 2006. Id.
paras. 67, 72. The ICJ thus considered Serbia the only respondent in the Bosnian Genocide case.
Id. para. 77.
' See id. paras. 288-97 (detailing alleged commission of genocide throughout Bosnia).
6 "The town of Srebrenica is nestled in a valley in eastern Bosnia, about fifteen kilometers
from the Serbian border." Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 11
(Aug. 2, 2001). "In 1991, the population of the municipality was 37,000, of which [seventy-
three] percent were Muslim and [twenty-five] percent were Serb." Id.
Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, paras. 421-24, 471.
Id. para. 47 1. In May of 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed S.C. Res. 827,
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criminal General Ratko Mladic who was primarily responsible for the
Srebrenica massacre.9
This Note discusses the effect of the Bosnian Genocide decision on
Serbia's past and future cooperation with the ICTY, which is a prerequisite for
the country's accession to the European Union (EU). A renewal of conflict in
the Balkans, however limited, would be devastating for the region and beyond.
It would be a serious blow to Europe, raising the specter of increased refugee
flows. The EU has a direct and obvious interest in preventing further chaos in
the conflict-prone Balkans: an economic interest in developing markets and
trade routes with the region, and a security interest in protecting its frontier
against criminal activity, instability, and refugee flows. It is crucial, however,
that the EU stands firm in imposing the penalties for Serbia's ongoing
obstruction of international law, including suspending of Serbia's EU
accession process and conditioning pre-accession financial assistance on
Serbia's unequivocal cooperation with the ICTY.
This Note is comprised of six parts. To ensure a clear understanding of the
Bosnian Genocide decision and its implications for Serbia's accession to the
EU and European security, Part II of this Note sets out the history of the
Balkans with special emphasis on the war resulting from the demise of
Communist Yugoslavia. Next, Part II examines the Genocide Convention by
focusing primarily on provisions contained in articles II, IV, V, VII, and IX,
as those provisions were applied by the ICJ in Bosnian Genocide. Finally, the
overview concludes by outlining the history of the ICJ, with particular
attention paid to the court's jurisdiction, as this element was heavily disputed
by Serbia (the respondent) in Bosnian Genocide. Part III analyzes the
procedural posture of the case from 1993 to 2007. Special emphasis is given
to the language in the judgment requiring Serbia to take preemptive measures
to prevent genocide and extradite war criminals. Part IV shortly maps out
Serbia's accession process from 2005 through the end of 2007. It also points
out key economic and security issues Serbia faces on its path to the EU.
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter Resolution 827]. It is important to
differentiate between the ICJ and ICTY. The ICJ is a permanent body exercising jurisdiction
only over charges one nation files against another nation. International Court of Justice, The
Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l (last visited May 25, 2009). Unlike the ICJ,
ICTY is a temporary body empowered by the United Nations to exercise jurisdiction solely over
individuals charged with committing war crimes in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. ICTY -
TPIY: About the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited May 25, 2009).
9 Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, para. 471.
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Finally, Part V analyzes the potential effects of Serbia's eventual accession on
European security in light of Serbia's continued failure to comply with the
Bosnian Genocide judgment. This Note concludes with the strong message
that Serbia's unconditional cooperation with the ICTY should be a mandatory
prerequisite before the country is allowed to further integrate with the EU.
Dropping this condition for Serbia's accession is unacceptable, as it would
convey to the rest of the world that rules and standards do not matter to the
EU.
HI. BACKGROUND
A. Balkan History
1. Early History
Looking at the history of the Balkans reveals that hostilities are not new to
the region;'0 the crisis of the 1990s "reflects the conflicts of the past.""
People of Slavic descent first began emigrating from Eastern Europe to the
Balkans in the sixth century. 2 These early settlers were the ancestors of
present-day Serbs and Croats, which means that the two groups have ties of
kinship and were, in fact, originally one people. 3 The Slavic peoples were
originally entirely pagan, but one group of Slavs, the Serbs, settled in the east,
an area increasingly targeted by Catholic Orthodox missionaries from
Constantinople. 4 Another group, the Croats, settled to the west, in an area
which became increasingly Roman Catholic. 5 The expansion of the Ottoman
10 In the context of this Note, Balkans is the historic and geographic name used to describe
the region of southeastern Europe, encompassing the countries of Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
" William L. Hurlock, The International Court of Justice: Effectively Providing a Long
Overdue RemedyforEnding State-Sponsored Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 12
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 299, 316 (1997) (citing HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 195 (1994)
(providing history of the region)).
12 CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, YuGOSLAvIA'S BLOODY COLLAPSE: CAUSES, COURSE AND
CONSEQUENCES 17 (1995).
"3 Id.; see also TIM JUDAH, THE SERBS: HISTORY, MYTH AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
YuGOSLAVIA 7-8 (Yale Univ. Press 2000) (1997) (describing the arrival of the Slavs in the
Balkans and the shared origins of Serbs and Croats).
'4 BENNETT, supra note 12, at 17; JUDAH, supra note 13, at 9, 43-44.
s BENNETT, supra note 12, at 17.
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Empire into the region of Bosnia and surrounding area in the fifteenth century
brought Islam into this religious mix. 6 The Ottoman rulers did not force its
people to convert to Islam but rather encouraged Christian members of the
Ottoman Empire to change their faith by providing "economic and political
benefits [for] conversion."' 7 In Bosnia, it has been estimated that many people
became Muslims. I" It was at this point that the region of Bosnia became a
diverse mix of Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Orthodox inhabitants. 9
For centuries, Christian Europe felt threatened by having a large Islamic
state in the heart of Europe.2" After Slavs from Serbia got involved in an 1875
rebellion in Bosnia, Russia saw an excellent opportunity to weaken the
Ottoman Empire and intervened, helping free its Slavic neighbors from the
Ottoman regime.2'
"[W]ars may occur between ethnic, religious, racial, or linguistic groups.
Since religion, however, is the principal defining characteristic of civilizations,
fault line wars are almost always between peoples of different religions."22
Catholic Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Orthodox Serbs represent three
different world civilizations: the West, the Islamic world, and the Orthodoxy.
When unrest broke out in the region in the 1990s, each group could depend on
the support of neighbors that shared their faith. For example, Germany was the
first to recognize Croatia after it declared independence, followed by Austria,
Italy, and the United States.23 Even the Vatican sided with Croatia: "the Pope
declared Croatia to be the 'rampart of [Western] Christianity' and rushed to
extend diplomatic recognition to the ... state[ ] before the European Union
did. ,24
Even though the Balkans region has always been divided along religious
lines, its people were all of Slavic descent and spoke variations of the same
language.2' For hundreds of years, however, the Slavic groups of the Balkans
16 Id. at 18-20.
17 Id. at 19.
18 Id.
1 See Barry A. Fisher, The Bosnia War: Religion, History and the Gypsies, 17 WHITIER
L. REV. 467, 469-70 (1996) (discussing the history of Bosnia).
20 LONNIE R. JOHNSON, CENTRAL EUROPE: ENEMIES, NEIGHBORS, FRIENDS 75-76 (1996).
2 JUDAH, supra note 13, at 66-67.
22 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER 253 (1996).
23 Id. at 282.
24 Id.
25 JUDAH, supra note 13, at 7-8; BENNETr, supra note 12, at 16-19.
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were ruled by large foreign empires; the Serbs and Bosnians lived under
Ottoman rule,26 while the Croats were controlled by the Austrians.27
Regardless of their religious differences, a growing movement of "South Slav"
nationalism began in the early twentieth century as a response to this centuries-
long history of foreign rule.28 The movement aimed to unite all the Southern
Slavs (Yugoslavs) into an independent nation.29 Serbia's goal was to be the
dominant state that would carry out the unification of these peoples.3" Serbian
leaders envisioned the state as a way for them to exert their power and
dominance over a larger portion of territory, rather than an opportunity for
Slavic brotherhood and unity.3
In 1908, Muslim Turkey began to regain some of its power and an alarmed
Austria resolved to annex Bosnia before the new Turkish regime could regain
control over it.32 Strong popular opposition to the annexation developed in
Russia, and Serbia, closely related to Bosnia geographically and ethnically,
was outraged by the annexation.33 Serbia had long desired Bosnia because
"Serbia's most direct route to the sea-the economic obsession which was the
core of modern Serbian nationalism-lay through the province."34 The bitter
resentment that the annexation caused among Serb and South Slav nationalists
led to the growth of revolutionary groups and secret societies dedicated to the
overthrow of Austrian reign in Bosnia.35 Tensions ultimately escalated in the
assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a young Serbian
assassin, Gavrilo Princip, while visiting Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.36 Austria-
Hungary declared war on Serbia one month later, triggering the outbreak of
26 BENNETT, supra note 12, at 19.
27 See id. at 24 (referring to Hadsburg control of Croatia).
28 See JUDAH, supra note 13, at 92-93 (describing political factions, including the Southern
Slavs, during this time).
29 Id. at 94.
30 See id. at 56-57 (providing historical context for the Serbian vision of a Slavo-Serbian
empire, a Greater Serbia).
31 Id.; BARBARA JELAVICH, HISTORY OF THE BALKANS: TWENTIETH CENTURY 109-10
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (1983) ("The greater Serbian goal... was thus a state based not
on strictly ethnic principles, but on the acquisition of lands that had historic associations or that
had at some time been under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox church.").
32 JUDAH, supra note 13, at 91-93.
" See id. at 92 (describing certain Serbs as "bitter about the annexation").
34 MISHAGLENNY, THE BALKANS:NATIONAISM, WARAND THE GREAT POWERS, 1804-1999,
at 254 (1999).
3 JUDAH, supra note 13, at 95-96.
36 Id. at 95-97.
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World War I." At its outset, World War I was a dispute between Serbia and
Austria-Hungary, with the other great powers joining in later due to
previously-formed strategic alliances.
On December 1, 1918, after the end of World War I, the Serb nationalists
achieved their long-standing goal of creating the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes (Kingdom).3" This Kingdom combined the territory of the
present-day countries of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia,
Kosovo, and Macedonia.39 However, the Kingdom "was defacto created as
the result of a Serbian mini-expansion as a stage in the process which began
in the nineteenth century";40 it soon became an "extension of the ... Serbian
army [base] for its eventual role in some future conflict."'"
2. Modern History
In January of 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany and hoped to
build ties with Yugoslavia as a strategic move towards gaining the natural
resources necessary for Nazi expansion.42 However, since Yugoslavia refused
to submit to Nazi rule, Germany invaded Yugoslavia in 194 L"
Lead by Josip Broz, better known as Tito, the Yugoslav Communist Party
units fought against Nazi occupation."4 In order to fight the German advance
in eastern Europe, Tito had to accept support and assistance from the Allies.45
On March 1, 1945, the Yugoslav Communist Party changed its name and
became known as the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), consisting mostly of
Serb soldiers and army officers. 4"
37 See id. at 97-101 (detailing the outbreak of war).
38 See id. at 106 ("[T]he Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was declared on 1
December 1918.").
9 See id. at 107 (mapping these boundaries).
0 Dusko Sekulic, The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: The Case of
Yugoslavia, in RACE AND ETHNIClTY: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICALAPPROACHES 221 (John
Stone & Rutledge Dennis eds., 2003).
41 Id. at 223.
42 GLENNY, supra note 34, at 435.
43 See id. at 485-88 (describing the invasion and resistance).
44 Id. at 486.
45 Id. at 929-30.
4 Yugoslavia- World War II, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-14923.htmil (last
visited May 25, 2009).
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Following World War 11, the Kingdom fell under the Soviet communist
sphere of influence.47 The monarchy was abolished in 1945,48 and the newly
formed government was known as the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY), consisting of the republics of Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia,
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia along with the autonomous provinces
of Kosovo and Vojvodina' 9 Tito, adhering to Marxist ideology and skeptical
of nationalism, managed to suppress ethnic dissent and conflicts between
nationals of the Yugoslav republics.50 Communist rhetoric told the story of a
peaceful Yugoslavia where people of different ethnicities would live in
harmony and cooperation.51 The Communists vowed never to allow any one
nation to dominate Yugoslavia the way the Serbs had dominated the
Kingdom. 2 Although little evidence suggests that there was ethnic tension in
Tito's Yugoslavia, this was less an indication that people were living in
harmony and unity and more an indication that Tito's repressive tactics
instilled a fear of expressing true sentiments.5 3
Following Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia suffered economic hardship
and scandalous corruption; 4 great unhappiness with an inefficient government
47 See BENNETr, supra note 12, at 51-53 (detailing communist influences after the Second
World War).
48 T. Modibo Ocran, How Blessed Were the UN Peacekeepers in Former Yugoslavia? The
Involvement of UNPROFOR and Other UN Bodies in Humanitarian Activities and Human
Rights Issues in Croatia, 1992-1996, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 193, 203 (2000).
49 Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 569 (1992).
'0 See Tim Judah, Yugoslavia: 1918-2003, BBC HISTORY, Feb. 4, 2003, http://www.bbc.co.
uk/history/worldwars/wwone/yugoslavia_03.shtml (stating that the majority of those who died
during the "war years" were nationalists).
s Cf id. ("Tito's forces... offered an ideal-a dream of 'brotherhood and unity'-that
would link the nations or peoples of Yugoslavia.").
52 See GoJKO VUCKOVIC, ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND CONFLICT: THE SOURCES OF NATIONAL
COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA 106 (1997) (citing Edward Kardelj,
Address on Proposed Constitution (Radio Belgrade broadcast Dec. 5, 1945)) ("The old system
of hegemonistic greater-Serb cliques... has been done away with. The Federative People's
Republic of Yugoslavia has grown out of the voluntary unification of our peoples according to
the principles of self-determination and equality of rights.").
13 See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW
NATIONALSM 20-21 (1993) (stating that under Tito, "[tihe society marched forward, willingly
or unwillingly, under the banner of 'brotherhood and unity.' To call yourself a Croat or Serb
first and a Yugoslav second was to risk arrest as a nationalist and a chauvinist.").
See id. at 93-54 (describing the "ruins of Yugoslavia" after Tito's death); see also
id. 40-47 (detailing the chaotic conditions after Tito's death).
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and failing economy, coupled with a desire to find someone to blame, made the
population of Yugoslavia primed for the introduction of an extremist leader in
Tito's wake." By the late 1980s, Serbian nationalist Slobodan Milogevi6 had
risen to power.5 6 Starting in 1987, Milogevid "endorsed a Serbian nationalist
agenda" and "exploited a growing wave of Serbian nationalism in order to
strengthen centralised rule in [Yugoslavia]."" Milogevi6 denied allegations
that he exploited Serbian nationalism in his rise to power.5" In a 1995
interview with Time magazine, he said:
All my speeches up to '89 were published in my book. You can
see that there was no nationalism in those speeches. We were
explaining why we think it is good to preserve Yugoslavia for all
Serbs, all Croats, all Muslims and all Slovenians as our joint
country. Nothing else.5 9
Milogevid's rose to power amidst growth of nationalism in all the former
Yugoslav republics following the collapse of communist governments
throughout Eastern Europe.60
When Mikhail Gorbachev renounced the "Brezhnev Doctrine"' in 1989,
the resultant collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, as well as the
termination of the Cold War, unleashed repressed nationalist desires.62
" See id. at 40-47 (describing the state of unrest at the time).
56 See GLENNY, supra note 34, at 626-28 (describing the political power and aims of Serbian
President Slobodan Milo~evid).
11 Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment, 76
(Oct. 16, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-2aiO I1029e.htm.
58 See, e.g., James R. Gaines et al., I Am Just an Ordinary Man, TIME, July 17, 1995,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983190-2,00.html (Milogevid
denying appeals to Serbian nationalism in an interview).
59 Id.
60 IGNATIEFF, supra note 53, at 4-10.
6! See JOHN SPANIER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 353 (12th ed. 1992)
(1960) ("Gorbachev announced that socialist countries had no right to intervene in each other's
affairs. The clear implication was that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead."). The "Brezhnev
Doctrine" asserts that any communist state may intervene in the affairs of another communist
state to prevent its "subversion" by the West. Id. at 215, 393. Gorbachev affirmed that he would
not intervene to prevent the end of communist regime in Eastern European countries. Id. at 393.
62 See IGNATIEFF, supra note 53, at4-1 0 (discussing the rising tides of nationalism following
the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall).
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3. Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe
By 1991, Croatia and Slovenia had begun making plans for secession from
Yugoslavia." On June 24 of that year, the prime minister of Yugoslavia, Ante
Markovic, issued an unambiguous warning to both the Croats and Slovenes:
"The federal government will counter unilateral secession with all available
means."'  One day later, citing economic drain by the Serbian-controlled
SFRY, the richest republics of the federation, Slovenia and Croatia, declared
independence.65 On June 27, the Yugoslavian army attacked the Slovenian
militia,66 and soon joined the Orthodox Christian Serb minority in their
hostilities against the Roman Catholic Croats in Croatia.67 After Slovenia and
Croatia seceded, Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, and Macedonians exited the YPA,
leaving it more dominated by Serbs than ever before.68
Shortly thereafter, on October 15, 1991, the Bosnian Parliament declared
its independence from Yugoslavia as well.69 In January 1992, the Bosnian
Serbs, led by aggressive nationalist Radovan Karadzic, organized a Bosnian
Serb Republic as a way of preventing the official separation of Bosnia from
Yugoslavia. 7' The European Community and the United States recognized
Bosnia's independence by April 7, 1992.' Immediately after, Bosnian Serbs,
backed by the YPA, declared independence from the newly recognized state
63 See MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 87-89 (Penguin
Books 1996) (1992) (discussing Croation and Slovene plans to declare independence).
6 Id. at 89.
s Charles L. Nier, III, The Yugoslavian Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability of the
Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Modern World, 10 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 303, 310 (1992); Roger Thurow, Yugoslav Secessions Underscore the Forces Tearing
Nation Apart, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1991, at Al.
" Weller, supra note 49, at 570 ("[The Yugoslavian Army], supported by a column of heavy
armor..., attacked the provisional Slovenian militia.").
67 See Nier, supra note 65, at 311 (describing "factors [that] ha[d] combined to result in open
conflict between the ethnic Serb minority within Croatia, the Yugoslav Army, and the Croatian
security forces").
's See id. at 312 (describing how Serbs "gain[ed] control of over one-third of Croatia").
69 Timothy Heritage, Bosnia's 'Sovereignty' Fuels All-Out War Fears Moscow Talks Offer
Glimmer of Hope, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Oct. 16, 1991.
70 NORMAN M. NAIMARK, FIREs OF HATRED: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
EUROPE 159 (2001).
" Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm (last visited
May 25, 2009) ("Full recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence by the United
States and most European countries occurred on April 7, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was
admitted to the United Nations on May 22, 1992.").
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of Bosnia, and this regional tension quickly escalated into the worst conflict
in Europe since World War 11.72 Bosnian Serbs and Croats began to see their
Muslim neighbors differently. "Serbs and Croats under the influence of war
psychosis have now revived their dangerous belief that Moslims remain at
heart Orthodox or Catholic Christians who will at some future point return to
the fold, willingly or otherwise., 73 Soon, people stopped calling themselves
Bosnians, instead identifying themselves as Bosnian-Serbs, Croats, or
Muslims.74 The Serb minority announced the formation of a separate
"Republika Srpska" (RS)75 and an army led by YPA General Mladic soon
occupied two-thirds of Bosnia's territory,76 hoping that it would later be
absorbed into greater Serbia."
Immediately after international recognition of Bosnia, Serb forces crossed
the Drina from the Serbian border and laid siege to Muslim cities on April 7
and 8." All of Bosnia was swallowed in war by mid-April.79
A pattern of destruction of Bosnian towns and villages soon became clear:
the YPA would set up road blockades around towns and warn Serb inhabitants
to evacuate. 0 Then, the YPA would subject the remaining Muslims and
Croats to intense artillery fire, forcing the civilians to hide for days, until they
were "softened up sufficiently by the [YPA]'s artillery, [and then] paramilitary
groups would move in" and start their campaign of killing and destruction.'
It appeared that these paramilitary groups were essentially commanded by the
Serbian government, despite no formal link with Belgrade. 2
72 See Carol J. Williams, Regional Vote in Yugoslavia Risks Conflict, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992,
at Al. The YPA "purged its top ranks of moderates and non-Serbs just two days before the
referendum" for Bosnian independence, and "the pro-Serbian presidency that commands it ha[d]
vowed not to pull troops out of Bosnia even if voters decide to secede. Bosnia [was] home to
about 1.35 million Serbs and most of Yugoslavia's defense industries" at the time. Id.
73 GLENNY, supra note 63, at 142.
74 Id. at 143.
" JUDAH, supra note 13, at 204-05.
76 STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA HERZEGOvINA: ETHNIc CONFliCT
AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 131-36 (1999).
17 See id. at 193 (referring to Bosnian Serbs' "focus[ ] on gaining international recognition
for their own state... and its eventual union with Serbia").
78 Id. at 129.
79 Id.
80 JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A WAR CRIME 73
(Penguin Books 1997) (1996).
8" Id. at 73-74.
82 Id. at 79.
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Ethnic cleansing was carried out in Serb-held areas of Bosnia until only a
few thousand Muslims and Croats were left in all Serb-occupied regions.s3
Cultural relics were similarly purged from the area:
The Serbs, furthermore, were guilty of the complete eradication
of Muslim cultural monuments-mosques, libraries, and the
like-in territory under their control. The apparent scorched-
earth approach of the Serbs to Muslim cultural and religious
structures suggests either a total lack of control by Serb leaders
over extremists, or an obsession with removing all signs of
Muslim presence.8"
Bosnians shared a multiethnic cultural world "symbolized over centuries by
bridges, libraries, artistic treasures, and the Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, and
Jewish houses of worship [built] side by side and sharing the same skyline in
Mostar and Sarajevo." 5 These acts of violence sought to eliminate any
evidence of the existence of that shared culture between Croats, Serbs, and
Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia.86
In addition to the tactic of cultural destruction, Bosnian-Serb militias used
detention camps and ethnic cleansing in their war effort. 87 During the war, as
many as 6,000 Bosnian-Muslims were incarcerated in the notorious Omarska
Camp where guards" 'regularly and openly killed, raped, tortured, beat and
otherwise subjected prisoners to conditions of constant humiliation,
" "The term 'ethnic cleansing' has frequently been employed to refer to the events in Bosnia
and Herzegovina .... " Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, para. 190. General Assembly
Resolution 47/121 refers to " 'the abhorrent policy of 'ethnic cleansing,' which is a form of
genocide,' as being carried on in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Id. (quoting G.A. Res. 47/121,
pmbl., U.N. Doe. A/RES/47/121 (Apr. 7, 1993)). Ethnic cleansing "is in practice used, by
reference to a specific region or area, to means 'rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by
using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.'" Id. (quoting The
Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Resolution 780, 55, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/35374 (Feb. 10, 1993)).
8 BURG & SHOUP, supra note 76, at 174.
85 Michael A. Sells, Kosovo Mythology and the Bosnian Genocide, in IN GOD'S NAME:
GENOCIDE AND RELIGION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 193 (Omer Bartov & Phyllis Mack,
eds. 2001).
86 Id
" BURG& SHOUP, supra note 76, at 12, 32, 171-81.
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degradation, and fear of death.' ,8 One survivor from Omarska recounted his
experience:
The worst event was when I watched one young man as they
castrated him. Right now I can hear his cry and his prayers to be
killed.... His executioner was his friend from school. He cut his
body and he licked his blood. He asked himjust to kill [him] and
to stop all that suffering. All day and all night we heard his
prayers and his crying until he died. 9
On May 20, 1992, the war began a new phase when General Mladic was
named commander of the newly formed army of the RS. 9° In the next few
days, General Mladic started directing a number of large-scale shelling attacks
at the outskirts of Sarajevo, beginning a Serb siege of the city that would last
until the summer of 1995. 91
4. Srebrenica Massacre
Srebrenica was one of the few pockets in western Bosnia that remained
outside the control of the Serbs during the fighting between 1992 and 1995.92
While the residents of Srebrenica were holding their position, they were cut off
from the world and needed humanitarian assistance badly.93 Help came from
French General Phillipe Morillon, United Nations Protection Force
commander for Bosnia.94 Concerned about the safety of over 60,000 civilians
in Srebrenica, General Morillon entered the town on March 11, 1993, without
88 NAIMARK, supra note 70, at 160 (citing ICTY Tribunal Update 78 (Apr. 6-11, 1998)).
89 STEVAN M. WEINE, WHEN HISTORY IS A NIGHTMARE: LIVES AND MEMORIES OF ETHNIC
CLEANSING IN BOSNiA-HERZEGOVINA 35 (1999).
90 BURG & SHOUP, supra note 76, at 131.
9, Id. at 131-32.
92 See HONIG & BOTH, supra note 80, at xvii ("Except for a few days in April 1992, Muslims
remained in control of Srebrenica through three years of war.").
93 See id. at 80 (discussing the deteriorating situation after Srebrenica was cut off from the
outside world).
94 Id. at 82-83. DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA,
EUROPE'S WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR I1439 (1997). UNPROFOR was assigned to
former Yugoslavia from February 1992 to April 1995. Former Yugoslavia - UNPROFOR,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co-mission/unprof-b.htm (last visited May 25, 2009).
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permission from the United Nations.95 His actions on that day led to the
creation of the first U.N. "safe area" of the thirty-mile radius around
Srebrenica.96 At the time the Security Council passed the Resolution to
establish the safe area, Srebrenica was facing increased attacks from Serb
paramilitary forces and was near surrender. 97 However, implementing the safe
zone proved to be a difficult task. While initially 34,000 troops were called
for,98 nations were unwilling to provide troops; by the summer of 1995,
Srebrenica was guarded by only 750 Dutch soldiers.99 Since, due to the lack
of resources, the area could not be connected to land controlled by the Bosnian
government, it remained "a vulnerable island amid Serb-controlled
territory."' 00
On July 11, Srebrenica fell to the Serbs, and its citizens were either killed
or forcefully displaced from the area.'0 ' In 2004, the U.N. High Representative
for Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown, had the Government of Republika Srpska form
a commission to investigate these events.'0 2 The committee released a report
in October 2004 with the names of 8,731 confirmed missing and 7,800 known
dead persons from Srebrenica.'03 Dragan Cavic, the President of Republika
Srpska, acknowledged in a televised address that Serb forces killed several
thousand civilians in violation of international law and called the Srebrenica
9 ROHDE, supra note 94, at xv.
96 The "safe area" was created when the Security Council passed Resolution 819 on
April 16, 1993. S.C. Res. 819, 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993); see HONIG & BOTH,
supra note 80, at 85-97 (discussing the entry of Morillon into Srebrenica and the subsequent
creation of a safe area).
" See ROHDE, supra note 94, at xv (noting Srebrenica's crumbling defenses and several
attacks).
9 HONIG & BOTH, supra note 80, at 116.
9 ROHDE, supra note 94, at 5.
'0 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 13 (Aug. 2, 2001).
.0. See Press Release, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., Ten Years After Srebrenica
(July 11, 2005), http://www.ictj.org/en/news/press/release/264.html (discussing the Srebrenica
massacre and its tenth anniversary).
102 Paul Vallely, The Big Question: Why are Dutch Soldiers Being Suedfor the Massacre at
Srebrenica?, INDEPENDENT (London), June 19, 2008,availableat http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/the-big-question-why-are-dutch-solders-being-sued-for-the-massacre-at-s
rebrenica-849944.html.
103 Id.
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massacre "a dark page in Serb history.""' On November 10, 2004, the
government of Republika Srpska issued an official apology.'°5
The atrocities in Bosnia lasted from April 1992 until December 14, 1995,
when the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Dayton Accords) officially ended the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia.0 6  While Serbian President Milogevid negotiated this peace
agreement in the name of the Bosnian-Serbs, General Mladic was indicted by
the ICTY for crimes stemming from the Srebrenica massacre.'0 7
But crucially, the Dayton Accords does not grant amnesty for the war
crimes committed during the conflict' 08-an omission on Milogevid's part that
was to pave the way for his eventual prosecution.'09 In sum, successful
imposition of the Dayton Accords was critical to the suppression of fighting
in Bosnia.
B. 1948 Genocide Convention
In 1948, moved by the grave atrocities and human rights violations
committed by the defeated Axis Powers during World War II, the member
states of the United Nations drafted the Genocide Convention." 0 The U.N.
" Public International Law & Policy Group, A Review of Current Events, BALKAN WATCH,
June 28,2004, http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/docs/BW/BalcanWatch.28June_04.pdf.
105 Banja Luka, Bosnian Serbs IssueApologyfor Massacre, BOSNIA REPORT, Nov. 11,2004,
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report-format.cfrm?articleid=l 147&reportid=166.
106 See The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. &
Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 [hereinafter Dayton Accords] (documenting
the terms of the agreement). To ensure that all parties to the Yugoslav conflict understood their
obligation to apprehend indicted war criminals, the Dayton Accords included provisions that
require all parties "to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other
violations of international humanitarian law," id. art. IX, and to ensure that "[n]o person who
is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and no
person who is under indictment by the Tribunal... may stand as a candidate or hold any
appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina," id.
Annex 4, art. IX.
107 Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment, 26 (July 24, 1995),
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/ind/en/kar-ii950724e.pdf.
'0' Dayton Accords, supra note 106, Annex 7, art. VI.
'09 On May 22, 1999, Milo~evid was indicted by the ICTY for war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. Prosecutor v. Milo~evid et al., Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (May 22, 1999). His
trial ended without a verdict because he died during the proceedings. Prosecutor v. Milo~evid,
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Terminating the Proceedings (Mar. 14, 2006).
10 Hurlock, supra note 11, at 304-05. See generally Genocide Convention, supra note 2
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General Assembly, in its adoption, declared genocide to be a crime condemned
by the civilized world."'
1. The Provisions of the Genocide Convention
Article II of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group."
12
The Genocide Convention also deems acts of conspiracy, incitement, attempts,
and complicity as punishable by law;" 3 and it further requires contracting
nations to extradite alleged offenders.' Finally, it establishes ICJjurisdiction
over all related claims arising between signatory parties." 5
Recognizing genocide as an international crime, the Convention is
concerned both with the prosecution of individuals responsible for genocide
and the effectiveness of legislation to punish genocide as implemented by the
signatories." 6 Article IV of the Convention applies the Convention's terms to
("Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on
humanity .... ").
.. Hurlock, supra note 11, at 304.
112 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
113 Id. art. 3(bHe).
114 Id. art 7.
115 Id. art. 9.
116 See Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The ICJ, the Genocide Convention, and the United States, 6
WIS. INT'L L.J. 43, 52 (1987) (discussing state responsibility under the Genocide Convention).
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both individual citizens and national leaders." 7 While Article I imposes a
broad obligation on states to prevent genocide," 8 Article V requires the
Contracting Parties to enact legislation that would impose penalties on
individuals found guilty ofgenocide, l 9 and Article VIII allows states to ask the
U.N. to take action to prevent and suppress genocide. 121
2. Jurisdiction Over the Crime of Genocide
The Genocide Convention requires that either a tribunal established where
the act occurred hear the claim or that an international tribunal be established
to adjudicate all claims arising between relevant parties.'12
3. The International Court of Justice
The United Nations Charter signed by member nations in 1945, provided
for a tribunal, such as the ICJ, 122 to exercise jurisdiction solely over claims
arising between nations. 123 The ICJ only has jurisdiction on the basis of
consent, i.e., it has no true original jurisdiction. 24 Jurisdiction is often a key
question for the ICJ, due to frequent jurisdictional challenges by the
respondent. 121
I11. BOSNIAN GENOCIDE DECISION
On March 20, 1993, Bosnia instituted judicial proceedings with the ICJ
against Yugoslavia, alleging that Yugoslavia had violated the Genocide
Convention by directing, encouraging, and assisting Serb military and
... Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 4.
118 Id. art. 1.
19 Id. art. 5.
120 Id. art. 8.
121 Id. art. 6.
122 U.N. Charter art. 92.
,23 Statute of the International Court of Justice, July 28, 1945, art. 34, para. 1 (stating "[o]nly
states may be parties in cases before the Court").
124 Id. art. 36 (outlining ICJ's bases for jurisdiction).
125 See id. art. 36, para. 6 (anticipating disputes over the ICJ's jurisdiction).
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paramilitary forces in carrying out genocide. 126 Yugoslavia denied providing
support and denied any involvement in committing or encouraging genocide.'27
In its application to the court, Bosnia also asked the court to order
Yugoslavia to "cease and desist" in its violations of the Genocide Convention
and customary laws.121 More specifically, Yugoslavia was to refrain from the
acts of ethnic cleansing, mass rapes, destruction of communities and religious
institutions, bombardment and siege of civilian population centers, starvation
of civilian population, interference with delivery of humanitarian supplies, and
any support of those who were engaged in military action against Bosnia.'29
A. Order for Provisional Measures: April 8, 1993
In its order on April 8, 1993, the ICJ began by noting that Article IX of the
Genocide Convention gives the courtjurisdiction to hear disputes related to the
application of the Genocide Convention in this case." 0 The court determined
that both Bosnia and Yugoslavia are responsible for fulfilling the commitments
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a signatory of the
Genocide Convention.131 Furthermore, the court noted that Yugoslavia should
"take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of
genocide," and it should also make certain that any military or paramilitary
troops under its control or influence, or supported by it, "do not commit any
acts of genocide" against Bosnian Muslims or anyone else.132 The Srebrenica
genocide happened two years after this order.113
126 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) 1993 I.C.J. 3, 5 (Apr. 8) [hereinafter Order of
Apr. 8].
127 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.) 1996 I.C.J. 595, 605, 615 (July 11) [hereinafter Preliminary
Objections] (Yugoslavia objecting that it "is not taking part" and is "not party to" the alleged
events).
121 Order of Apr. 8, supra note 126, at 3-4, 6.
129 Id. at 7.
130 Id. at 4.
"'1 Id. at 15-16.
132 Id. at 24 (requiring Serbia to ensure "that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed
units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which
may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of genocide.., or
of complicity in genocide...").
"' See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing Srebrenica genocide).
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B. Jurisdiction: Judgment of July 11, 1996
By the order of July 14, 1995, the proceedings on the merits were
suspended,134 while the ICJ heard the objection of Yugoslavia to ICJ
jurisdiction over the case.'35
The question presented by Yugoslavia's objections was whether Bosnia
was a party to the Convention.'36 The Court determined that Bosnia was a
party for two reasons: first, Bosnia gave the Secretary-General of the U.N. a
Notice of Succession, which the Secretary-General accepted as Bosnia's valid
succession to the Genocide Convention, 137 and second, by way of membership
with the United Nations, Bosnia was entitled to "automatic succession.' 38
The court concluded that in either case, it was clear that as of the filing of the
application on March 20, 1993, Bosnia had been a party to the Convention. 139
The ICJ therefore had jurisdiction over the case."4
C. The Applicable Law
Hearing allegations of genocide brought by one state against another for the
first time in its history, the court had to decide the scope and meaning of
different provisions of the Genocide Convention. Whereas Serbia argued that
the only responsibility the Convention placed on the states was punishing the
failure of preventing or punishing acts of genocide committed by individuals,
the ICJ disagreed. 14 It found that the Genocide Convention imposes an
affirmative duty on the contracting parties not to commit genocide and other
ancillary acts, such as conspiracy to commit genocide and complicity in
genocide. 142
"' Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1995 I.C.J. 279, 279-80 (July 14).
131 See generally Application on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11) (reporting the court's
opinion on Yugoslavia's objections, including those related to jurisdiction).
136 Id. at 604-09 (Yugoslavia argued that Bosnia was not a party to the Convention).
117 Id. at 610-11.
118 Id. at 611-12.
"9 Id. at 612.
140 Id.
' See Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, paras. 142-79 (detailing the dispute between Serbia
and the court over the acts which comprise the crime of genocide).
142 Id. paras. 143, 179.
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When Bosnia began presenting testimony before the ICJ, alleging that
Yugoslavia had violated the Genocide Convention by directing, requesting,
and assisting Serb paramilitary forces in carrying out systematic killings of
Muslim citizens in Bosnia,' Yugoslavia denied involvement in the war, and
more specifically, denied providing any support or direction to Serb
paramilitary troops in Bosnia." After hearing both parties, the ICJ issued an
order directing Yugoslavia to take preemptive measures in order to prevent the
crime of genocide.'45
D. Final Judgment: February 26, 2007
On February 26, 2007, the ICJ issued a ruling in Bosnian Genocide finding
that Serbia did not commit, conspire to commit, or incite the commission of
genocide, but that Serbia violated its obligations under the Genocide
Convention by failing to extradite General Mladic to the ICTY and to comply
with the court's order to act to prevent genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995.146
1. Questions of Proof
The court in Bosnian Genocide set a high standard of proof for its holding:
"charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully
conclusive."' 47 The court concluded that the mass killings, operation of the
detention camps, and atrocities committed by the Serbian forces between 1992
and 1995 were not acts which were committed with the specific intent to
destroy Bosnian-Muslims as a group. 4 In the absence of the court's finding
that genocide occurred outside of Srebrenica, Bosnia's argument that specific
intent could be proven by the "pattern" of genocidal or potentially genocidal
143 Order of Apr. 8, supra note 126, at 3-7.
Id. at 21. But see The Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary General on the Situation
of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 31, delivered to the Security
Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/24516, A/47/418 (Sept. 3, 1992) (noting that
there is no evidence that Yugoslavia took "effective measures to use their influence to put a stop
to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia").
'41 Order of Apr. 8, supra note 126, at 8-9.
' Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, para. 471; see also id. paras. 186-267 (discussing the
relevant body of facts and principles of law which the court considered and applied).
147 Id. para. 209.
141 See id. paras. 242-76 (recounting the evidence with respect to mass killings and specific
detention camps); id. para. 277 (concluding the court's opinion).
2009]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
acts committed throughout the territory, against persons identified as belonging
to a specified group, was unsuccessful.' 49 The court refused to draw any
conclusions from the refusal of Serbia, the respondent, to submit unredacted
versions of documents in its possession. 50
2. Serbia Did Not Commit Genocide
In a 13-2 decision, the ICJ found that acts committed at Srebrenica were
acts of genocide. 5' The court concluded that acts of systematic mistreatment
and torture committed at Srebrenica fell within Article 11(a) and (b) of the
Convention and were committed with the specific intent to destroy Bosnian
Muslims. 5 2 However, the ICJ found that it had not been conclusively
established that those atrocities were committed with the specific intent to
destroy the protected group in whole or in part, as required by the Genocide
Convention.'53 The court stated that the legal definition of the "protected
group" must be a positive one and not a negative one.'54 Consequently, the ICJ
inquired whether genocide was committed against Bosnian Muslims, and not
against "non Serbs" as Bosnia claimed.'55 Regarding the definition of what
constitutes a "part" of the group, the court also concluded that priority must be
given to the "substantial criteria," i.e., "the part targeted must be significant
enough to have an impact on the group as a whole" in order to decide whether
a genocide had actually been committed.' 56
The ICJ examined the evidence regarding a large number of claims,
including: encirclement, shelling, starvation, deportation and expulsion, and
destruction of historical, religious, and cultural property.'57 The ICJ could not
establish that many of the acts were specifically intended to destroy Bosnian-
Muslims in whole or in part.' As for the destruction of historical, religious,
and cultural sites, the ICJ found conclusive evidence of the deliberate
destruction of Muslim locations based on their historical, cultural, and
'4 Id. paras. 207, 370-76.
5o Id. paras. 205-06.
Id. para. 471.
152 Id. paras. 297, 319.
153 Id. paras. 187, 319.
114 Id. paras. 194-96.
'"I Id. para. 196.
136 Id. para. 198.
137 Id. para. 322.
"s Id. para. 334.
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religious heritage.'59 However, the court explained that such destruction was
not committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial, or religious group, and thus did not fall within the categories of "acts of
genocide" set forth in Article I of the Genocide Convention. 6 '
3. State Responsibility
Taking into account the preceding conclusions of the ICJ, the critical issue
of the case remained whether Serbia was responsible for the acts of genocide
committed at Srebrenica by the army of Republika Srpska, the secessionist
entity of Bosnia.'6 '
ICJ jurisprudence allows states to be held responsible if persons, groups of
persons, or entities engage in genocide, while acting in "complete dependence"
on the state, of which those persons, groups of persons, or entities are merely
the instrument.'62 However, in Bosnian Genocide, the ICJ did not find that the
person, or entities that committed the acts of genocide at Srebrenica had
sufficient ties with Serbia to be considered completely dependent. According
to the judgment, insufficient evidence was presented to establish that the
Republika Srpska, its army, or any paramilitary units were completely
dependent on Serbia in fact. 163  Consequently, the acts of genocide at
Srebrenica could not be attributed to Serbia, its organs, persons, or entities
wholly dependent on it.'"
Finally, Bosnia presented overwhelming evidence corroborating the
testimony about massive killings in Bosnia.'65 Testimony also showed that the
victims were predominantly Bosnian-Muslims, suggesting that the killings
might have been systematically targeted.' 66 However, the ICJ found that
Bosnia had not conclusively established that the mass killings of Bosnian
Muslims were committed with the specific intent to destroy the protected
group in whole or in part.
67
'5 Id. paras. 341-44.
'60 Id. para. 344.
161 Id. paras. 376-77.
162 Id. pam. 392.
163 Id. pam. 394.
164 Id.
165 Id. paras. 242, 246-77.
'66 Id. para. 276.
167 Id. para. 277.
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4. Serbia Was Not Complicit in Genocide
In an 11-4 decision, the ICJ found that Serbia was not complicit in
genocide under Article I(e) of the Genocide Convention applying the
Convention's terms to both individual citizens and national leaders. 6 Having
decided that the VRS could not be considered an organ of Serbia, the court
next addressed the highly debated question of whether genocide could be
attributed to a state based on the degree of direction or control that state has
over a person or group of persons. 169 The ICJ decided in an earlier case that
for the conduct of persons or a group of persons to give rise to the
responsibility of a state, it would, as a matter of principle, have to be proven
that the state had "effective control" over such conduct, 70 instead of the lower
standard of "overall control" used by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic.'7' The
ICJ ultimately determined that Bosnia had not proven that instructions were
issued by the Serbian authorities to commit the massacres and that Serbia did
not exercise the required effective control over the VRS.
172
The ICJ next examined whether Serbian state organs or persons knowingly
furnished "aid or assistance" in the commission of the Srebrenica genocide. 173
The presented evidence did not persuade the ICJ that Serbia supplied the
responsible Republika Srpska leaders with "aid and assistance" in carrying out
the genocide.77 The ICJ found that the facts were insufficient to conclusively
show that the decision to eliminate the Muslim community's male population
in Srebrenica was brought to the attention of the Serbian authorities in
Belgrade. 175 The ICJ therefore could not find that Serbia was complicit in the
genocide. 176
18 Id. paras. 424, 471.
169 Id. para. 393.
170 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 65 (June 27); Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, paras. 399-400.
' Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, para. 402 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- I-
A, Judgment, 145 (July 15, 1999)).
,72 Id. para. 413.
' Id. paras. 412-20.
174 Id. para. 422.
171 Id. para. 423.
176 Id. para. 424.
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5. Serbia Violated the Obligation to Prevent Genocide
The ICJ found in a 12-3 decision that Serbia had violated its obligation to
prevent genocide.' The ICJ noted that states are obligated to employ all
reasonable means to prevent genocide and failure to do so is a violation of the
Genocide Convention.' During the Srebrenica massacre, Serbia's strong
political, military, and financial links with the Republika Srpska put it in a
position to influence the Bosnian Serbs who committed the genocide.' 79
The court expressed that "the [Serbian] leadership, and President Milogevi
above all, were fully aware of the climate of deep-seated hatred which reigned
between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica region."' 0 The
court decided Serbia did nothing to prevent the genocide, despite their
obligation to do so.'
6. Serbia Violated Its Obligations Under the Convention by Not
Extraditing General Mladic
By a vote of 14-1, the ICJ found that Serbia violated its Genocide
Convention obligation to transfer individuals accused of genocide or related
acts to the ICTY for trial. 2 States have an obligation to provide necessary
cooperation and assistance to the ICTY; the ICTY was created by the U.N.
Security Council decision under Chapter VII which imposes binding
obligations on all states.8 3 Specifically, Resolution 827 requires all states to
"cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance
with the present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal.""'
Furthermore, the ICTY's statute requires all members of the international
community to comply "without undue delay" in "the arrest or detention of
persons" indicted for war crimes and "the surrender or transfer of the accused
to the International Tribunal."'8 5
177 Id. para. 471.
" Id. para. 430.
179 Id. para. 434.
80 Id. para. 438.
181 Id. paras. 438, 471.
182 Id. para. 471.
183 Id. paras. 445-47.
'14 Resolution 827, supra note 8, 4.
185 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
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Although some states and entities (e.g., Serbia) assert they lack the
necessary domestic legislation to comply with the indictments and orders
issued by the International Tribunal, Resolution 827 explicitly requires all
states to take "any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement
[its] provisions."' 18 6
During oral proceedings, Serbia contended that its duty to cooperate with
the ICTY was met "following the regime change in Belgrade in... 2000, thus
implicitly admitting that ... [it had not fulfilled its obligations] during the
preceding period."'87 The court noted that there was abundant evidence
suggesting that indicted General Mladic spent prolonged periods of time in
Serbian territory without being arrested. 8  As Serbia's violation of its
obligations under the Genocide Convention continued throughout the time of
the final judgment, the court concluded that Serbia should immediately take
effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligation under the
Convention to punish acts of genocide and transfer to the ICTY individuals
accused of genocide.8 9
7. The End Result
In Bosnian Genocide, the ICJ dealt with genocide in the narrow legal sense
of that term, requiring specific intent to destroy a protected group in whole or
in part. 9 ' This stands in contrast to the colloquial meaning of genocide, which
is often used by the public and the media as shorthand for crimes against
humanity in order to gather public support for intervention.' 9' Legally,
however, it is a specific intent that distinguishes genocide from other crimes
against humanity and human rights abuses in general. 92 Thus, it was not
sufficient to establish that Serbian forces deliberately and unlawfully killed
Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808, art. 29, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (May 3, 1993), adopted in S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
' Resolution 827, 4.
IS? Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, para. 448.
88 Id.
Id9 d. para. 459.
9 Id, para. 187.
'9' See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Dare We Call It Genocide?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2004, at A21 (urging the Bush administration's acknowledgement of "genocide" in
Darfur but not using the Convention's definition).
92 Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, para. 188.
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Bosnian-Muslims in Srebrenica, without also establishing proof that the
killings were committed with the specific intent to destroy Bosnian-
Muslims. 193
By applying the specific intent requirement in such a rigorous manner and
requiring evidence beyond any doubt, the ICJ makes it extremely difficult to
prove state-sponsored genocide.' 94 Requiring direct evidence to establish
specific intent makes genocide impossible to prove without unequivocal
documentation and has the effect of reducing political pressure on future
genocidal regimes. A state may commit all of the objective elements of
genocide but could legitimize them on the basis of military strategy.' 95 It
seems that the state will likely not be held responsible for genocide as long as
its officials keep incomplete records that create doubt as to the actual intent.
However, the ICJ explained that this stringent standard corresponds with the
seriousness of the allegations.'96
The court's refusal to infer intent from a pattern of abuse ultimately
defeated Bosnia's argument. Serbia's connection to the Army of Republika
Srpska (VRS) has been conclusively documented by the ICTY.' 97 Serbia's
connection with the VRS also appears to be confirmed by evidence which the
ICTY permitted Serbia to withhold "in the interests of the good administration
of justice."'98 After the decision, the New York Times reported that files,
including the minutes of the Supreme Defense Council, a top decision making
body in Yugoslavia during the 1992-1995 Bosnian conflict, addressed Serbia's
control and direction, "revealing in new and vivid detail how Belgrade
financed and supplied the war in Bosnia, and how the Bosnian Serb Army,
though officially separate [from Yugoslavia] after 1992, remained virtually an
extension of the Yugoslav Army."' 99 The ICJ's approach kept important
evidence like this from coming to light.
'3 See id. paras. 188-89 (explaining the specific intent standard).
'9' See id. para. 421 (describing the specific intent standard for finding state complicity in
genocide).
' See id. para. 422 (referring to military aid provided the Republika Srpska and the VRS,
but not finding specific intent).
96 Id. para. 293 (quoting Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, IN 37-38
(Apr. 19, 2004)).
9"Id. paras. 238-41.
'"Id. para. 54.
9 Marlise Simons, Genocide CourtRuledforSerbia Without Seeing Full WarArchive, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 9, 2007, at Al.
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The core difficulty of the Bosnian Genocide decision is clear: it is difficult
to conceive of a state exhibiting the specific intent required by the Genocide
Convention's definition of genocide. 20 ' For the near future, the court's
judgment in Bosnian Genocide leaves open the question of Serbia's
cooperation with the ICTY, which seems to be a strong precondition to
Serbia's eventual accession to the European Union.
IV. SERBIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. History of the EU
The idea of the European Union was born after World War 11.201 In
response to the threat of Soviet communism and military power, Western
European nations united economic forces in an effort to secure peace, rebuild
Europe, and counter the Soviet threat.20 2 The Union was founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member
states.
2°3
The launch of the Economic and Monetary Union in 1989, the creation of
the official European Union with the Maastricht Treaty in 1991,204 and the
launch of the Euro as its monetary unit in 2002 unified the member states both
economically and politically.
2 5
While Western Europe unified, Eastern European countries, including the
Western Balkans, remained under the control of the domestic communist
parties until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.206 It was not
until 1993 that the first steps were initiated towards the enlargement of the EU
200 See Bosnian Genocide, supra note 1, para. 421 (discussing the specific intent standard).
201 GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (2d
ed. 2002).
202 Id.
203 Treaty on the European Union, art. F, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) [hereinafter Treaty
on the EU].
204 The EU at a Glance, Europe in 12 Lessons, Ten Historic Steps, http://europa.eu/abc/121e
ssons/lesson_2/indexen.htm (last visited May 25, 2009).
205 See id. (referring to the introduction of Euro notes and coins in 2002).
206 Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in Force?, 23 DENV. J. INT'LL. &
POL'Y 1, 3 (1994).
[Vol. 37:621
WHEN SKELETONS COME OUT OF THE CLOSET
into Central and Eastern Europe." 7 The EU offered countries in Eastern
Europe and the Western Balkans, including Serbia, the opportunity to join the
Union.2 8  This offer was contingent upon their ability to "assume the
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions
required.,219
In 2004, the EU expanded, accepting ten new members from Eastern
Europe.210 A second wave of accession occurred in 2007 with the accession
of Bulgaria and Romania.2 ' A third wave is expected to include the Western
Balkan states of Croatia, Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia, and
Montenegro.212
B. Serbia's EU Negotiations
At this time, Serbia is a potential candidate for EU membership.1 3
Although all Eastern European states were given an opportunity to join, if they
so desire,214 the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) or the process of
integration that Serbia must go through to prepare for EU accession differs
from the accession process offered to other Eastern states.215 Furthermore, the
207 Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Copenhagen 13 (June 21-22, 1993)
[hereinafter Copenhagen Council].
20' European Commission, Enlargement, Countries, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countri
es/indexen.htm (last visited May 25, 2009).
209 Copenhagen Council, supra note 207, at 13.
20 These countries included Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Ten
New Member States to the European Union, Apr. 16, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 236).
2. Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the
European Union, Apr. 25, 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 157) 29 [hereinafter Accession of Bulgaria and
Romania].
22 European Commission, Enlargement, Potential Candidate Countries, http://www.ec.euro
pa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidate-countries/indexen.htm (last visited May 25, 2009).
213 European Commission, The Policy, Countries on the Road to EU Membership, http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/countries-on-the-road-to-membership/index-en.htm (last
visited May 25, 2009). Croatia, Turkey, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are
candidate countries. Id. Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo are potential
candidate countries. Id.
214 Copenhagen Council, supra note 207, at 13.
215 "Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) is a special kind of regional approach of the
EU to the Western Balkan countries," which include Albania, Bosnia, FYR Macedonia, Croatia,
Serbia, and Montenegro. The EU Integration Office, Stabilisation and Association Process, http://
www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=68 [hereinafter SAP] (last visited May 25,2009). SAP
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Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) constitutes the first step in the
pre-accession process and it also imposes unique requirements on Serbia.21 6
For example, the SAA requires Serbia to cooperate with the ICTY by
extraditing all fugitive war criminals located within its borders and emphasizes
Serbia's obligation to respect international law in general.217
The SAA pre-accession negotiations with Serbia2 8 were officially opened
on October 10, 2005.219 Since Serbia did not meet its commitments on
cooperation with the ICTY, the European Commission decided in May of 2006
to suspend the negotiations.22' However, "the Commission stressed its
readiness to resume negotiations as soon as [Serbia reached] full cooperation
with the ICTY. ' 22'
Two years after the first unsuccessful round of negotiations, the Serbian
authorities made progress, 2 2 which "enabled the Commission to resume the
is tailored to each country and, "[a]part from a number of incentives, primarily of a financial and
material nature, SAP sets out certain economic and political conditions [for states to comply with]
as well." Id.
216 The SAA serves as the basis for implementation of the EU accession process. European
Commission, Enlargement, Stabilisation and Association Agreement, http://ec.europa.eu/enlarg
ement/glossary/terms/saa-en.htm (last visited May 25, 2009). The individual agreements are
adapted to the specific situation of each candidate country "while establishing common political,
economic and commercial objectives and encouraging regional co-operation." Id.
217 See Christian Pippan, The RockyRoadto Europe: The EU's Stabilisation andAssociation
Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality, 9 EuR. FOREIGN AFF.
REV. 233, 238 (2004) ("[T]he Copenhagen criteria continue to be the decisive benchmark for...
[a state's] prospect for accession .... ").
21' Following the independence ofMontenegro-proclaimed on June 3,2006-the Republic
of Serbia became the legal successor of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia
Country Profile, EUbusiness.com, http://www.eubusiness.com/Serbia/serbia-country-profile (last
visited May 25, 2009). This Note concerns only Serbia's path to EU accession and will not
address Montenegro.
2"9 Commission Decision c(2007)2487, Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document for the
Republic of Serbia 2007-2009, Annex [hereinafter MIPD], available at http://ec.europa.eu/en
largement/pdf/mipd~serbia_2007_2009_en.pdf.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 On June 18, 2007, "the ICTY Chief Prosecutor submitted a report to the UN Security
Council in which she took note of the positive developments in Serbia." Commission Staff
Working Document, Serbia 2007 Progress Report, at 16, COM (2007) 663 final (Nov. 6,2007)
[hereinafter 2007 Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/keydocuments/20
07/nov/serbia_progressreports en.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2009). Specifically, in May and
June 2007, two fugitive ICTY indictees were arrested and extradited. Id. at 17. However,
despite this progress, Serbia has not yet achieved full cooperation with the ICTY, since "[flour
ICTY indictees are still at large." Id.
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SAA negotiations [in June of 2007]."223 On November 8,2007, Serbia and the
EU initialed the SAA, which is viewed as a key first step towards
membership.22 However, even though former chief ICTY prosecutor Carla
Del Ponte made it clear that full compliance with the ICTY is a condition for
actually signing the SAA, 225 Serbia signed the Agreement on April 29,2008.226
Even though "Serbia made significant progress on cooperation with ICTY,
including the arrest of [General] Karadzic," the EU made it very clear that
ratification and implementation of the SAA is still subject to Serbia's full
cooperation with ICTY.227
C. Pre-Accession Assistance and Serbia's Key Issues
Starting in 2007, Serbia began receiving pre-accession financial assistance
under the Pre-Accession Instrument (IPA).22' The Serbian national allocation
for 2007 amounts to E 164.8 million.29 The main strategic objective of the
IPA assistance to Serbia is to support the country in the transition from the
status of a potential candidate to a candidate country and finally to full EU
membership.23 IPA assistance will help Serbia meet the accession criteria by
funding the economic, justice, and security-related criteria for membership,")
as those are presently the key problematic areas for the nation.232
223 Id. at 16.
224 Initialing the SAA means that the agreement "text has been settled and will not incorporate
any [significant changes in the future]." But the agreement comes into effect only after signed.
Igor Jovanovic, Serbia, EU Initial SAA, SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, http:/se
times.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/enGB/features/setimes/features/2007/ 11/08/feature-01.
223 Id.; Serbia, EU Sign SAA in Luxembourg, B92 NEWS (Belgrade), Apr. 29, 2008, http://
www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.phpyyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=29&navid=49819.
226 Press Release, Europa, Key Findings of the Progress Reports on Albania, Montenegro,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo (Nov. 5,2008), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressRelea
sesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/672&format-=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangua
ge--en.
227 Id.
28 MIPD, supra note 219, at 3.
2007 Report, supra note 222, at 5.
230 MIPD, supra note 219, at 6.
231 Id.
232 See id. (noting Serbia's "limited capacity and resources").
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1. Economic Issues
Due to a history of economic mismanagement and isolation, the democratic
Serbian leadership faced overwhelming economic challenges when it assumed
power after Milogevid in 2000.233 In the final year of his rule, Milo~evi6
increased the money supply in order to fund reconstruction projects after the
Yugoslav Wars,23 1 pushing the inflation rate to 79.6% in 2000.235 The country
suffered from high levels of internal and external indebtedness: external debt
in 2000 was $12.2 billion, or about 140% of Serbia's GDP.236 Further,
Serbia's gross domestic product in 1999 was only forty-five percent of its 1990
level.237
Even though there has been some economic improvement since 2000,238
Serbia is still far from having a functioning market economy and the capacity
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU.239
The issue of long-term unemployment requires particular attention;
unemployment in 2006 was twenty percent,240 with some forecasts predicting
it could increase to over thirty percent by the end of2009.24' Serbia's National
Employment Action Plan for 2006 "envisaged the creation of some 150,000
jobs by 2009," but in order to accomplish that goal, Serbia called for more IPA
support from the EU.242
233 STEVEN WOEHREL, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: CURRENT
SITUATION AND U.S. POLICY at 9 (2006), available at http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL3
037 l.pdf.
234 Id.
235 2007 Report, supra note 222, at 45.
236 Miroljub Labus, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Economic Relations
of FR Yugoslavia, Statement at the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Donors' Conference
(June 29,2001), available at http://www.seerecon.org/calendar/200 1/events/frydc/statements/ml
abus.htm.
237 WOEHREL, supra note 233, at 9.
238 See 2007 Report, supra note 222, at 45-46 (statistical data on Serbian economy).
239 Id. at 19.
240 MIPD, supra note 219, at 7.
24! European Commission, Enlargement, Serbia, Economic Profile, http://ec.europa.eu/enl
argement/serbia/economic_profile-en.htm (last visited May 5, 2008).
242 MIPD, supra note 219, at 7.
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2. Security Related Issues
EU member states are a prime target for organized crime. 43 This threat to
their security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in
drugs, people, and weapons. Such criminal activities are often associated with
weak or failing states.2"
a. Drugs
Since it is located along the Balkan transit route, Serbia is an exchange
"point for the transfer of heroin, cocaine, marijuana and synthetic drugs." '245
Ninety percent of the heroin in Europe comes from Afghanistan and is
distributed through Serbia and neighboring countries. 2" Since Serbia has not
adopted a national strategy on preventing drug abuse and reducing supply, drug
trafficking remains a serious concern.247
b. Human Trafficking
Serbia has been recognized as a major source, transit, and destination
country for human trafficking.248 Victims, mostly from Ukraine, Moldova,
Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria, are transported through Serbia to
various destinations in Western Europe.249 In the last seventeen years,
over 200,000 people have been smuggled through the area.250
Organized crime in Serbia has thrived through war, sanctions, poverty, and
political instability, thus making it difficult to build a stable country that will
243 European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs, The Fight Against Organized Crime,
Freedom, Security and Justice, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/crime/fsj-crimeintroen.
htm (last visited May 25, 2009).
244 JAVIER SOLANA, EUROPEAN COUNcIL, A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD 9
(July20, 2003), available at http://www.ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressdata/en/reports/
76255.pdf.
245 2007 Report, supra note 222, at 41.
246 EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, MONITORING THE
SUPPLY OF HEROIN TO EUROPE, available at http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/at
t62086 EN emcdda tds herointrafficking 2008.pdf.
247 2007 Report, supra note 222, at 41.
248 Id. at 43.
249 Id.
250 The Balkans, Ten Years on: Europe's Banlieue, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2005, at 50. Guns
and stolen vehicles are also smuggled through the area. Id.
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grow economically and assume a meaningful place in a united Europe. It
appears that one of the most effective ways of dealing with organized crime
within the EU, defending its security, and promoting its core values, is through
strengthening institutions of justice and promoting the rule of law in the
Balkans.25' Neglecting the above mentioned challenges would have severe
consequences for southeast Europe and "a greater likelihood of political
extremism, insurgency, and terrorism.
'25 2
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SERBIA'S EVENTUAL ACCESSION
The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that Europe still
faces security threats and challenges. European security and prosperity
increasingly depends on an effective multilateral system and integration, since
it is in the EU's interest that countries on its borders are well-governed and
stable, especially countries to the east of the EU and Mediterranean.253 Weak
governments, a history of conflict, and organized crime in those areas all pose
problems for Europe.254 The eventual integration of Serbia as a new member
state will increase European security by bringing the EU closer to troubled
areas and developing cooperative relations.2 However, such progress cannot
be accomplished without the rule of law. Establishing a system in which
justice is administered openly and fairly requires that the local governments
combat organized crime and corruption and hold war criminals accountable.256
In addition to the drug and human trafficking concerns, Serbia's accession
creates serious security threats for the EU.257 Large-scale aggression against
any EU member state is now improbable; instead, Europe faces threats which
are "more diverse, less visible and less predictable. ' 25 ' They include terrorism,
251 EDWARD C. MEYER & WILLIAM L. NASH, BALKANS 2010: REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT
TASK FORCE SPONSORED BY THE CouNcIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CENTER FOR PREVENTATIVE
ACTION 3 (2002).
252 Id.
213 Solana, supra note 244, at 7-8.
25 See supra notes 243-52 (discussing these issues in Europe).
215 See supra notes 243-52 (stressing the importance of stability in that region).
256 MEYER & NASH, supra note 251, at 51.
257 See Solana, supra note 244, at 3 (noting that "[a] number of countries and regions risk
becoming caught in a downward spiral of conflict, insecurity and poverty"); see also id. at 3-6
(citing "failed states and organised crime" as the third major threat to Europe).
21 Id. at 4.
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states, and organized
crime. 2
59
Improved information and telecommunication technologies; the abolition
of controlled borders; increased mobility of people, goods, and services; and
increasing economic interdependencies have moved organized crime towards
the globalized market.26" Transnational organized crime is a threat to states
and societies, undermining human security and the fundamental obligation of
states to provide law and order.26' Fighting organized crime is a necessary step
within the efforts to resolve internal conflicts and to prevent the proliferation
of arms and terrorism. 26 2 Moreover, security is an essential element for EU
membership, especially for a number of states and regions that, like Serbia, are
affected by cycles of conflicts, insecurity, and poverty.263
While Serbia's accession would benefit the EU by providing an opportunity
for the EU to expand its markets and trade routes and to unite Europe
peacefully after years of division and conflict, the costs of allowing Serbia to
accede at this time would likely outweigh the benefits. If the EU extends its
borders to envelop Serbia, it will need to prepare for more international crime,
as organized crime is a greater problem in Serbia than many of the current
member nations.2 4
Progress in key reform, such as local self-government and the judiciary, and
the fight against corruption and organized crime must be increased and aligned
with European standards. The economic and political power held by organized
crime groups "often makes them attractive to young people who are unable to
find work in the legitimate marketplace, thus perpetuating the problem. 265
The national strategy for fighting organized crime in Serbia has not yet been
finalized; thus, fighting organized crime in Serbia remains a source of serious
concern because "any country that fails to decisively address the problems of
29 Id. at 3-6.
260 See id. at 11 (discussing globalization and new threats to Europe).
261 The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More
Secure World: Our SharedResponsibility, 165 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.un.org/se
cureworld/report3.pdf.
262 Id.
263 Is SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE DOOMED TO INSTABIlITY? 2-5 (Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos &
Thanos Veremis eds., 2002) (pointing to political instability, socio-economic problems, and
security issues in Southeast Europe).
264 See supra Part IV.C (discussing problems and obstacles unique to Serbia).
265 MEYER & NASH, supra note 251, at 62.
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organized crime and the lack of rule of law will remain a threat to the stability
of the entire region. 2 6
6
Institutions in Serbia will be successful in addressing security and crime
issues only if they establish solid cooperation with the EU because, in their
essence, the challenges that Serbia is facing go beyond its borders and send a
ripple effect across Europe. This is true both for fighting organized crime, and
prosecuting war crimes.
Pre-accession assistance could help Serbia meet these challenges and make
sustainable progress in its efforts to become an EU member. However, it is in
the EU's interest to provide the carrots and sticks that will keep Serbia on the
path of political reform and progress. The carrots available to Serbia from the
EU are abundant: in return for continued peace, stability, and political and
economic reform, Serbia will earn closer association with European
institutions, privileged political and economic relations, and favorable trade
terms offered to member states. The primary stick at the disposal of the EU is
conditionality-the linking of assistance to specific performance goals.
Specifically, the EU should require that Serbia, under threat of losing its IPA
assistance, demonstrate its full cooperation with the ICTY.
Given the scale of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, if the EU continues
accession talks with Serbia without its compliance with ICTY extradition
requirements, the international community could perceive the EU to have
granted de facto amnesty to major perpetrators. Not only will this establish a
dangerous precedent within Europe, but it will also send a signal to future
regimes throughout the world that they have nothing to lose by engaging in
criminal acts like genocide.
To promote security and create long-lasting peace in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia, the international community needs to provide an effective
process for assessing guilt and bringing to justice individual perpetrators. In
assigning individual criminal guilt, the collective guilt that characterized the
years following World War II, and in part laid the foundation for the
commission of atrocities during the recent conflict in the territory of former
Yugoslavia, could be avoided.
The Treaty of the European Union obligates member states to respect the
principle of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, thereby promoting
peace and stability among new members.267 Peace in Eastern Europe is critical
266 Id. at 63.
267 Treaty on the EU, supra note 203, art. F.
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to EU stability because atrocities like the war in former Yugoslavia could
easily destabilize the EU politically, economically, and socially.
It is of paramount importance that the EU suspends Serbia's membership
talks and imposes conditions on IPA assistance until Serbia unequivocally
complies with the ICTY and cooperates in the apprehension and extradition of
indicted war criminals. The EU should be cautious, however. If Serbia does
not have the attractive incentive of eventual EU accession and regional
cooperation, it may again initiate conflict as it did during the Yugoslav Wars
of the 1990s.268 Providing the option of EU membership and conditioning it
upon Serbia's compliance with ICTY rulings and extradition requirements may
be the only way to preserve democracy, to prevent further violence over
nationalism, and to promote peace.
Conditioning Serbia's accession on compliance with ICTY will ultimately
benefit Serbia. EU membership will improve Serbia's ability to combat crime
because EU membership requirements, such as adoption of EU standards and
legislation with regard to justice and home affairs, will likely improve the
efficiency of both law enforcement and legal systems in the nation. 269
There can be no lasting peace in the territory of former Yugoslavia until all
war criminals are arrested and brought to justice. Serbia should not be able to
join the EU with all the rights and privileges that membership entails until it
honors its obligations to the ICTY. The EU will fail a profound test of its
moral, ethical, and political leadership if it does not act decisively to end the
freedom of men who have committed and condoned grave and heinous crimes
against humanity.
The international community, acting through the Security Council, has
raised expectations that war criminals will be held accountable for the terrible
atrocities they commit. If the accused are left free to continue to flout
international agreements and international law, is there really any less
likelihood of further violence in the former Yugoslavia? The failure to comply
268 See European Commission, Enlargement: Basic Arguments, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargem
ent/archives/press_corner/basic-arguments-en.htm (last visited May 25, 2009) (listing benefits
of EU enlargement, including "the extension of the zone of peace, stability and prosperity in
Europe [that] will enhance the security of all its peoples").
269 The list of legislation that each candidate must adopt prior to accession-the acquis
communautaire-is available at Europa and Eur-Lex. See European Commission, Enlargement,
How Does a Country Join the EU?, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement-process/acce
ssionprocess/how does a countryjoin the eu/negotiations-croatiaturkey/index-en.htm (last
visited May 25, 2009) (detailing requirements for accession and providing links to chapters of
the acquis).
2009]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
with extradition destroys the deterrent value of the international tribunals by
giving future tyrants a notice that they also have nothing to fear.
It is absurd to expect that thousands of victims in Bosnia could forgive and
forget; if the architects of atrocities in Bosnia are left unpunished, current
peace will be nothing more than an interval between cycles of violence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Yugoslav violence of the 1990s has run its course. Thirteen years after
the Dayton Accords ended the brutal war in Bosnia, democratic governments
across the states and regions of the former Yugoslavia share a common
ambition to join the EU.
Serbia has strong incentives to seek EU membership. In January 2007,
neighboring Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU20 two other neighbors,
Croatia and Macedonia, are official EU candidates. 7' Failure to make
progress toward eventual membership could have a negative impact on
Serbia's prosperity, especially in attracting foreign investment needed to fix
the crippled economy. Serbia would also forgo millions of Euro in IPA
assistance that it would receive as it advances its status from "potential
candidate" to "candidate." As Serbia has the goal of attaining membership in
the EU, EU officials must leverage this influence by repeatedly insisting that
Serbia's only path toward closer integration with the EU lies in Serbia's
cooperation with the ICTY.
Lip-service pledges of cooperation are not enough: unequivocal cooperation
and unambiguous extradition law is needed. Belgrade must make real progress
before the EU can focus on positive incentives and reward Serbia for its
cooperation: offering money and the ultimate prize of admission to the EU
club. This course of action is not only in the interest of justice but in the
interest of European security and peace.
270 See Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, supra note 211 (discussing Romania and
Bulgaria joining the EU).
"' See SAP, supra note 215 (discussing EU accession candidates).
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